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I
INTRODUCTION

There are several ways in which securities may be offered for sale in more
than one country. A domestic issuer might make a new issue of debt or equity
securities available in a single foreign jurisdiction, or he might issue the
security simultaneously in foreign and domestic markets. A shareholder
might sell domestic securities abroad, or sell foreign securities (or, in the
United States, depository receipts representing them) in a domestic market.
The expression multinational securities offering has been used in recent times to
refer exclusively to the simultaneous multinational new equity issue. Given
the obvious connections between simultaneous equity issues, however, nonsimultaneous multinational issues, and cross-jurisdictional trading, and the
perceived view that principles are needed for all aspects of the
internationalizationof securities markets, this essay will adopt a broader focus.
It will touch upon aspects of multinational securities offerings in both the new
issues and the trading senses, investigate the relationships of these
phenomena to other forms of the internationalizationof securities markets, and
evaluate the appropriateness of certain regulatory approaches.
This article will explore and assess the attitude of the Securities and
Exchange Commission towards some central questions concerning
multinational securities offerings. It will evaluate conflicts ofjurisdiction in an
administrative rather than a curial field. To an outsider, it is striking that
there exists a recurring appeal to "principles" in the SEC's decisionmaking
The
process, rather than a focus on purely pragmatic considerations.
Commission justified the development of the integrated disclosure regime for
foreign issuers during the period from 1979 to 1982 by invoking a principle of
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voluntarism.' A somewhat different principle of voluntarism has guided the
Commission's rule-making on the question of disclosure exemptions to
foreign issuers. This principle was especially noticeable in 1983 when the
Commission decided to restrict the "information-supplying" exemption to
section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2 On the question of
whether the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 apply to
offers and sales of U.S. securities to foreign investors, the Commission has
consistently appealed to a principle enunciated twenty-two years ago: The
Act will not apply if distribution is affected in a manner which will result in the
securities coming to rest abroad.A
In 1984 and 1985, the Commission asked for comments on a wide range of
markets. 4
securities
internationalization of
the
about
questions
Characteristically, the SEC seems to be searching for principles to guide its
response to the questions which it has raised, and there is more than a hint
that it wants to arrive at a set of principles regarding (or responding to) the
internationalizationof securities markets.
This article makes several arguments. First, internationalization is not a

phenomenon to be regulated. Instead, various international economic,
financial, and technological changes have created a new backdrop against
which the old questions of market efficiency, investor confidence, and investor
protection must be re-examined. Second, in the light of certain international
trends, the Commission's old principles now tend to obscure the central
questions about benefitting U.S. markets and U.S. investors. Third, and most
important, good reasons exist for encouraging foreign issuers to use U.S.
capital markets and for loosening the registration requirements of U.S.
offerings sold abroad.

The article begins by exploring the idea of the internationalization of
securities markets, and its relationship to regulatory policy. Next, attention is
directed to the position of foreign issuers whose securities are traded in U.S.
markets. The piece first considers the general arguments for treating these
issuers differently from domestic issuers, and then evaluates the adequacy of
the Commission's principles dealing with integrated disclosure, voluntary
entry, and the "information-supplying" exemption to the section 12(g)
reporting obligation. The article then focuses on the position of U.S. issuers
abroad, considering the general arguments for qualified application of the
1. See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
4. See, respectively, Request for Comments on Issues Concerning Internationalization of the
World Securities Markets, Exchange Act Release No. 21,958, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH)
83,759 (Apr. 18, 1985) [hereinafter Release No. 21,958]; Facilitation of
Multinational Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 6,568, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
83,763 (Feb. 28, 1985) [hereinafter Release No. 6,568]; Request for
comments concerning a concept to improve the Commission's ability to investigate and prosecute
persons who purchase or sell securities in the U.S. markets from other countries, Exchange Act
Release No. 21,186, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
83,648 (July 30, 1984)
[hereinafter Release No. 21,186].
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1933 Act, and assessing the Commission's principles. Finally, some remarks
will be offered on the problems raised by simultaneous multinational equity
offerings, which raise questions about both U.S. issuers abroad and foreign
issuers in the United States.
II
THE COMPONENTS OF INTERNATIONALIZATION

Over the last decade, there has been much talk about the internationalization
of securities markets. The expression is italicized to signify its uncertainty on
two fronts. First, there have undoubtedly been some important recent
developments in international securities practices, but doubt remains about
the actual scale of internationalizationto date, and much of the evidence has an
Perhaps responses to the SEC's request for
anecdotal appearance.
information are helping the Commission to clarify the facts. 5 To the extent
that hard evidence is lacking, however, it would be prudent to bear in mind
the distinction between (1) practices which are now technically possible and
may come to pass and (2) practices which are currently established. Further,
all should be wary (especially when it comes to making regulatory policy) of
the "gee-whiz" responses of some financial journalists.
Second, internationalization is a highly ambiguous term. If the SEC ever
organized a television quiz program, it could be the securities regulator's
version of I've Got a Secret. The contestant thinks of a fraudulent securities
transaction and gives us the clue that it contains at least one U.S. and one
non-U.S. element. The panelists and audience would have to guess the true
blend of domestic and foreign elements in the transaction. Upon calculation,
any of thirty-two guesses would logically be accurate and empirically feasible
responses to the clue, provided that the transaction's variable elements are
limited to the nationality of the issuer, the place of issue, the nationality of the
buyer, the nationality of the seller, and the place of the transaction. The game
could, of course, be made harder by recognizing as relevant variables such
matters as the principal places of business of the parties' broker-dealers, the
place of the preparatory conduct of the defendant, and the location of all
securities markets affected by the transaction.
Moving from the world of hypothetical quiz games to the reality of learned
papers and conference after-dinner speeches, it is equally difficult to guess
which kind of internationalizationthe speaker contemplates when he urges us
not to forget the powerful movement in that direction. He might have in
mind one or more aspects of cross-national securities transactions. For
instance, he may be thinking of the various Eurobond and Euronote markets
or the exotic world of SNIFs and RUFs, 6 which U.S. issuers use
5. Release No. 21,958, supra note 4. For additional valuable information, see Thomas,
Internationalization of the Securities Markets: An Empirical Analysis, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 155 (1982).
6. For a survey of some practical and legal problems regarding syndicated note issuance and
revolving underwriting facilities, and the Euromarkets generally, see Dunstan, EurocurrencY Lending
and Note Issues, in R. AUSTIN & R. VANN, PUBLIC COMPANY FINANCE 324ff (1986).
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extensively. 7 It is probable (given market capitalization well beyond the
resources of even the redoubtable Belgian dentists) that U.S. investors have a
very substantial interest in all kinds of Eurosecurities in spite of transfer
restrictions to U.S. citizens, such as "ninety-day lock-up" clauses, designed to
avoid the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933.8
Conversely, one may be thinking of the growth of issues of U.S. bonds by
foreign private and government issuers, 9 or of foreign investor trading in debt
securities issued in the United States. 1 0 One may also be referring to equity
matters-to issues of equities by U.S. corporations abroad,II to overseas
trading in U.S. equities,' 2 to overseas trading by U.S. investors,' 3 to foreign
companies issuing equity in the United States, 14 to the creation of ADR
trading of foreign equities in the United States,' 5 or to trading by foreign
16
investors in U.S. equity markets.
In a very active takeover market, internationalizationmay be a reminder of
the difficulties which arise when bidder and target are from different
jurisdictions. When the bid includes a share exchange offer, the takeover will
involve a double dose of international share trading, since target shares will
cross to the bidder and the bidder's stock will cross to the sellers.
7. U.S. issuers raised $6.2 billion in Eurobonds in 1983 and $6.8 billion in the first half of
1984. See Release No. 21,958, supra note 4, at 87, 384.
8. See Henderson, The Impact of U.S. Law on Euronote Facilities, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Apr. 1985, at
26, 27-28; Stoakes, How Public is a Euronote? EUROMONEY, Jan. 1986, at 27.
9. Release No. 21,958, supra note 4, at 87,384, reports that 19 foreign private issuers raised
$2.3 billion and foreign governments raised $3.1 billion of debt in the United States in 1984. See
Scott, Registration Requirements for Yankee Bond Issues in the U.S., INT'L FIN. L. REV., Mar. 1986, at 14.
10. Between early January and mid-March 1986, U.S. companies raised almost $40 billion in
straight and convertible bonds in the United States, at an annual rate of almost double the previous
year's rate. See The Unleveragingof America, ECONOMIST, Mar. 29, 1986, at 61. The removal of interestwithholding tax has increased the appeal of these securities to foreign investors.
11. See Evans, Offerings of Securities Solely to Foreign Investors, 40 Bus. LAw. 69 (1984).
12. In January 1985, approximately 200 NYSE-listed companies were also listed on the LSE, 43
on the Paris Bourse, and 6 on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. See Release No. 21,958, supra note 4, at
87,385. There is a well-established over-the-counter (OTC) Euro-equities market in which U.S.
stocks are traded. For a description of this market, see R. BURGESS, CORPORATE FINANCE LAW 25-27
(1985); Lim, Nestle-Euro-equity Pioneer, EUROMONEY, July 1985, at 14; The InternationalEquity League,
EUROMONEY, Nov. 1985, at 70; A World of Global Shares, ECONOMIST, May 31, 1986, at 90. The bulk of
the trading is handled by merchant and investment banks rather than by members of the LSE. Allard
& Shale, The Death Throes of the London Stock Exchange, EUROMONEY, Dec. 1985, at 16.
13. 1985 estimates were that U.S. institutions held $10-13 billion in foreign stocks, compared to
$1.2 billion five to ten years ago. Release No. 21,958, supra note 4, at 87,384, citing The Great
DeregulationExplosion, EUROMONEY, Oct. 1984, at 61.
14. Eighteen foreign companies (excluding Canadians) raised approximately $1 billion in equity
in the U.S. in 1983 and large amounts were raised from the 1984 Reuters and British Telecom issues.
Release No. 21,958, supra note 4, at 87,384.
15. At the start of 1984, 46 foreign securities or ADRs were listed on the NYSE, 52 were listed
on Amex, and 294 were quoted in NASDAQ. Release No. 21,958, supra note 4, at 87,385. In 1985,
ADR trading in some British stocks exceeded trading turnover on the LSE, leading the LSE to
announce that as from October 22, 1985, it would allow the New York affiliates of London member
firms to take part in ADR trading, notwithstanding the Exchange's single capacity rules. See Shale &
Winder, Reuters Squares up to SEAQ, EUROMONEY, Nov. 1985, at 85.
16. Net foreign purchases of U.S. equities increased from $3.9 billion in 1982 to $5.2 billion in
1983. Release No. 21,958, supra note 4, at 87,384.
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Alternatively, internationalization may be intended to identify certain
operational changes to securities markets, rather than the crossing of national
boundaries by issuers and investors. Securities markets are becoming
internationalized in this sense with the help of information technology, which
permits some limited linkages of stock exchanges, automated clearing
agencies, and quotation systems. 17 Although progress has not yet been
spectacular, given the capabilities of the electronic equipment, it has recently
been argued that linkages will develop which will cause search and transaction
costs of foreign investment to decline to a point of comparability with
domestic investment. 18
Another aspect of internationalization focuses on the establishment of
multinational securities firms. Entry barriers have been rapidly breaking
down over the past five years.1 9 Although significant changes have occurred
elsewhere, 20 the progressive relaxation during 1986 by the London Stock
Exchange of membership and other restrictive rules seems especially
important, given the Exchange's market capitalization and turnover. Changes
introduced on March 1, 1986, permit foreign external membership of the
exchange, 2 ' and on October 27th of that year (the date of London's "Big
Bang") the fixed-rate commission and single capacity (jobbing) requirements
will be removed. 22 It will then become straightforward for some U.S.
17. The following developed or proposed linkages of exchanges are described by the SEC: The
Singapore International Monetary Exchange and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange; the Sydney
Futures Exchange and the Commodities Exchange of New York; the Boston Stock Exchange and the
Montreal Exchange. See Release No. 21,958, supra note 4, at 87,385. The arrangements are far from
uniform. A limited linkage between Amex and the Toronto Stock Exchange has begun, and there are
proposals for linkages between the clearance and settlement systems of the major U.S. exchanges.
As to a linkage of the settlement systems, see London's Shield, ECONOMIST, Mar. 29, 1986, at 68. The
LSE is establishing an automated quotation system called SEAQ structured similarly to NASDAQ
and there is now a two-year pilot linkage between these systems. Reuters already has a London
based quotation system, which may become integrated with SEAQ. Shale & Winder, supra note 15, at
85. See generally Lim, Can the Trading Floor Survive? EUROMONEY, Dec. 1985, at 31.
18. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV.
747, 762-63 (1985).
19. For a description of some constraints to foreign entry which are now dissolving, see Miles,
Constraints on Broker-Dealers Operating Outside Their Home Country, 4 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 36
(1982). For a description of deregulatory progress up to early 1985, see Release No. 21,958, supra
note 4.
20. For example, during 1984 non-residents were permitted to acquire at first fifteen percent
and then fifty percent of Australian stockbroking companies. The proposals of the Ontario Securities
Commission for limited entry have not yet been implemented and are controversial. See Release No.
21,958, supra note 4, at 87,391 (proposals noted).
21. See Note, Stock Exchange Implements Three Key Changes, COMPANY LAw. 288 (1985). At least
some U.S. securities firms and banks are strengthening their already significant London operations.
See, e.g., ECONOMIST, Mar. 1, 1986, at 70 (Security Pacific's purchase of Hoare Govett). According to
an address by the Governor of the Bank of England to the American Chamber of Commerce on
January 21, 1986, ten U.S. commercial banks have bought participations in LSE member firms. See
Grant, Wall Street Plugs into London, EUROMONEY, Apr. 1986, at 108. The City Panel on Takeovers and
Mergers has issued a somewhat nervous release about problems of conflicts of interest. Multi-service
Financial Organizations and the Code (May 29, 1986) (press release on file in the office of Lau and
Contemporary Problems).
22. For accounts of other major changes expected to be made in British securities regulation in
1986, see Abrams, The FinancialServices White Paper-A LegalAnalvsis, 6 COMPANY LAW. 77, 122 (1985);
Pimlott, The Reform of Investor Protection in the U.K.-An Examination of the Proposals of the Gower Report
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securities firms to execute orders directly on the London Exchange at a
negotiated fee using their own internal communications technology. Further,
the United Kingdom stamp duty on share transactions was reduced in March
1986 to one-half percent, compared with the 1984 rate of two percent. 2 3 This
combination of factors may mean that the transaction costs for a U.S. investor
using a New York multinational securities firm to acquire shares listed on both
the New York and London Stock Exchanges will be almost the same whether
the purchase is executed in New York or London.
In the absence of comprehensive empirical data, one's impression is that
internationalization is much more advanced in some fields than in others.
Cross-border issues of securities appear to occur much more frequently for
debt securities than for equities. As to equities, cross-border trading (in the
United States, ADR trading) is well-established but cross-border equity issues
are relatively uncommon. 24 Although market linkages appear to be limited
and rudimentary to date, the development of multinational securities firms
seems to have reached an advanced stage, especially on the New
York/London axis with the reduction of entry and ownership barriers in
London. 25 In fact, the internationalization of securities firms seems to be
functionally the most important aspect of internationalizationat this time. It
raises major questions for securities regulators, especially regarding conflicts
26
of interest.
Because relatively few of its pronouncements have referred to non-U.S.
matters, the Securities and Exchange Commission seems to have adopted an
isolationist policy towards securities regulation for most of its fifty-two years.
Recently, however, the Commission has become very interested in
transnational problems. Difficulties concerning the enforcement of U.S.
securities laws and the collection of evidence of violations, 2 7 especially in the
teeth of secrecy and blocking laws, 28 have driven the SEC into contact with
and the U.K. Government's 4'hite Paperof January, 1985, 7J. COMP. Bus. & CAP. MARKET L. 141 (1985).
The Financial Services Bill, based on the White Paper, was before the Parliament in 1986. It must be
remembered, however, that although Euro-issues are very frequently listed on the LSE, most of the
trading is off-market; see Allard & Shale, supra note 12, at 16. Those authors also draw attention to a
new self-regulatory authority which was established in October 1985, the International Securities
Regulatory Organization, which will seek to regulate the Eurodebt and Euro-equity markets. Id. at
16.
23. See Before the Bang, ECONOMIST, Mar. 22, 1986, at 60.
24. See infra Part V of this article, especially at infra note 115.
25. See supra notes 17, 21 and accompanying text.
26. See Varn, The Multi-Service Securities Firm and the Chinese IWall: A New Look in the Light of the
Federal Securities Code, 63 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1984).
27. See Fedders, Policing Internationalized U.S. CapitalMarkets: Methods to Obtain Evidence Abroad. 18
INT'L LAw. 89 (1984). Recently, steps have been taken by the International Association of Securities
Commissions to address difficulties of international enforcement. See FIN. TIMES (London), July 17,
1986, at 1, col. 3.
28. For a useful overview of secrecy and blocking laws, see Fedders, Wade, Mann & Beizer,
Waiver by Conduct-A Possible Response to the Internationalizationof the Securities Markets, 6J. COMP. Bus. &
CAP. MARKET L. 1, 30-39 (1984) [hereinafter Fedders, Waiver by Conduct]. The waiver by conduct
proposal is that the act of engaging in a securities transaction in the United States should be treated
as a waiver of any foreign secrecy position upon which the trader might otherwise rely. Id. at 25-28.
This proposal has stimulated vigorous debate. For responses to the waiver by conduct article, see
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foreign governments and securities agencies. Commissioner Thomas, in
particular, took notice of the internationalizationof securities markets in a series
of articles and public addresses in the early 1980's.29 In 1984 and 1985 the
to
Commission made three concept releases drawing attention
internationalizationproblems across a broad spectrum, focusing on problems of
simultaneous multinational equity issues and the enforcement of U.S. laws in
the face of foreign secrecy laws. 30 Although the releases raise a host of
particular problems, it appears that the Commission seeks to develop general
principles regarding internationalization, perhaps hoping that new principles
will provide solutions to the specific questions posed. 3' Is it feasible,
however, to seek general principles on internationalization? Is the Commission
asking the right questions?
Respectfully, but without the deference which prudence might
recommend, this writer argues that the answer to the two questions is
negative. While a strategy is necessary in this area, it makes no sense to
expect that a set of economic and technological circumstances brought
together under the rubric of internationalization will supply the policy
framework. At least two reasons support this proposition.
First, seeking principles on internationalizationentails a confusion between
the regulatory setting and the regulatory substance. For example, suppose
you are a nineteenth-century Boston Fire Brigade chief who has just heard of
a major technological change, the invention of the safety match. When
production gets underway, ordinary people will have a cheaper, simpler, and
more accessible method of making fires than ever before. Naturally, you are
worried about the increased fire hazard inevitably associated with this
invention. City Hall asks you to draft a policy which will respond to your
concerns in a balanced fashion. It would be understandable if your first draft
Boyle & Thau, The Newest Configurationof the Ugly American: A Response to Mr. Fedders, 6J. COMp. Bus. &
CAP. MARKET L. 323 (1984): Bschorr, "Wavier by Conduct". Another View, 6 J. COMp. Bus. & CAP.
MARKET L. 307 (1984); Capitani, Response to Fedders' "Waiver by Conduct, " 6 J. CoMp. Bus. & CAP.
MARKET L. 331 (1984); Fedders & Mann, The Waiver by Conduct Concept-A Reply, INT'L FIN. L. REV.,
Dec. 1984, at 10; Lepine, A Response to Fedders' "Waiver by Conduct, " 6J. CoMp. Bus. & CAP. MARKET L.
319 (1984); Singer, The InternationalizedSecurities Market and InternationalLaw-A Rely toJohn M. Fedders,
6J. COMp. Bus. & CAP. MARKET L. 345 (1984); Wymeersch, Response to Fedders' "Waiver by Conduct, " 6
J. Comp. Bus. & CAP. MARKET L. 339 (1984); see also Release No. 21,186, supro note 4.
29. See, e.g., Thomas, Internationalizationof the World's CapitalMarkets: Can the S.E.C. Help Share the
Future?, 15 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 55 (1982) [hereinafter Thomas, Can the S.E.C. Help?]; Thomas,
Internationalizationof the Securities Markets, supra note 5; Thomas, ExtraterritorialApplication of the United
States Securities Laws: The Need for a Balanced Policy, 7 J. CORP. L. 189 (1982) [hereinafter Thomas,
ExtraterritorialApplication]; Thomas, Extraterritoriality in An Era of Internationalization of the Securities
Markets: The Need to Revisit Domestic Policies, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 453 (1983) (an expanded version of
the preceding article) [hereinafter Thomas, Extraterritoriality in an Era]; Thomas, International
Harmonization-Recent Developments in the Pursuitof Comparibility in General Purpose Reports of Multinational
Enterprises, 38 Bus. LAw 1397 (1983); Thomas, Increased Access to United States Capital Markets: A Brief
Look at the SEC's New Integrated DisclosureRulesfor Foreign Issuers, 5J. Comp. Bus. & CAP. MARKET L. 129
(1983) [hereinafter Thomas, Increased Access]. This list is not exhaustive.
30. See, respectively, Releases Nos. 21,958, 6,568 & 21,186, supra note 4.
31. Thus, the Commission's expression of interest in "any additional investor protection,
competitive, or market efficiency concerns raised by the internationalization of secondary market
trading." Release No. 21,958, supra note 4, at 87,387 (this release was confined to secondary trading
because its earlier Release No. 6,568 supra note 4, covered new equity issues).
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was headed Principlesfor Regulating the Safety Match. That focus on regulation
might lead you to look for ways of curtailing the manufacture or distribution
of safety matches, or even making Boston a match-free zone. Your initial
regulatory focus, in other words, would be a focus on regulating the new
technology. On further reflection, however, you will probably come to realize
that regulation might skew the development and availability of the new
technology, but the technology will, in the long run, be uncontrollable. You
may well conclude that the safety match does not change your task, but simply
makes it harder. The thrust of regulation should continue where it always
was, in providing safe, non-flammable surroundings which are adjusted in
detail to minimize the risk of abuse, but which reflect the overall policy concern
of fire prevention. So you submit your report, Improvement of Fire Preventionand
Control Techniques in the Context of Increased Risks.
The analogy between firemen and securities regulators is an imperfect
one. The securities regulator must respond to a multitude of new firestarters, some of which are manufactured by his regulatory colleaguesespecially by the regulators in the monetary, fiscal, and antitrust fields. It
sometimes must seem as if someone at City Hall is advertising free matches
for arsonists. Yet the analogy is strong enough to make the present point.
The enduring concerns of U.S. securities regulators are to promote efficient
U.S. markets, investor confidence in those markets, and investor protection
for those who are entitled to expect it from the United States. Several kinds
of internationalizationaffect the way in which those goals are pursued, generally
making the regulators' job harder. It would be wrong, however, to develop a
policy response to internationalization as such. Many influences shape the
development of markets and trading practices-influences such as return on
investment, political risk, currency restrictions, tax laws, and the availability of
32
technology. Regulation and regulatory cost may also be relevant factors,
but the influences of economics and technology are likely to be inexorable.
What is needed is a process of continuing review of regulatory policies which
is sensitized to changes in trading and the operation of markets.
A second objection to the quest for principles regarding internationalization
arises out of the chronic ambiguity of that expression, an ambiguity which has
already been noted.3 3 Suppose that the SEC decided, as a matter of policy, to
encourage the development of internationalizationon all fronts. Eventually, it
would find itself doing inconsistent things. For instance, suppose that the
SEC devised an effective method of encouraging the issuance and trading of
foreign securities in the United States. The consequential growth in the use
of U.S. markets by foreign issuers and traders would, to a certain extent, hurt
overseas issues and trading, and would discourage the development of stock
market linkages because the domestication within the United States of foreign
32. See Jarrell, The Economic Effects of Federal Regulation ofthe Market for New Securities Issues, 24 J.L.
& ECON. 613, 624 (1981). As to the effect of banking regulations on investment, see Harfield,
InternationalMoney Management: The Eurodollar, 89 BANKING L.J. 579 (1972).

33.

See supra notes 6-23 and accompanying text.
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capital and securities would reduce the pressure to establish such links. If,
pursuant to its policy of encouraging internationalization on all fronts, the
Commission then introduced measures to promote investor participation in
overseas markets, the result would act against the goals intended to be
achieved by freeing foreign issues and investment within the United States.
Regulatory policy must address questions which are much the same as they
were when the micro-chip was just a splinter, but current economics and
technology have made us ask them more insistently. The remainder of this
article will discuss aspects of multinational offerings of securities for sale or
subscription. The regulatory implications of other international movements,
such as market linkages and the establishment of multinational securities
firms, will be returned to only to the extent that the movements might
influence policy formation regarding multinational offerings. There shall be
more than one occasion to note the way that some new questions raised by
internationalizationdissolve on analysis into questions about the old themes of
securities regulation.
III
FOREIGN ISSUERS IN UNITED STATES CAPITAL MARKETS

A.

A Case for Differentiated Treatment

The arguments in favor of a differentiated system (which shall be called
the encouragement to foreign issuers approach) were forcefully presented by
Commissioner Thomas in a series of articles written more or less
contemporaneously with the Commission's deliberations on integrated
disclosure. 34 These deliberations led to the 1982 integrated disclosure
requirements. 35 The main arguments for requiring less disclosure from
foreign issuers than domestic issuers may be summarized as follows:
(a) U.S. investors should have every opportunity to diversify their investment
portfolios to spread risk and maximize returns. Accordingly, an increase in the
availability of foreign securities in U.S. markets will benefit U.S. investors by:
(i) enabling them to trade quickly and inexpensively in foreign securities through
liquid U.S. markets; and
(ii) improving the quantity and quality of information and analysis available to
them concerning those foreign issuers;
(b) to apply the same disclosure rules to foreign and domestic issuers is to put the
foreign issuers at a disadvantage, because some U.S. domestic disclosure requirements
36
are inconsistent with foreign commercial practices and accounting principles;
(c) U.S. markets will compete more
effectively with the Euromarkets if concessions in
37
disclosure requirements are made;
(d) Disclosure requirement concessions will also aid the development of uniform
international standards, which may eventually permit issuers an almost free choice

34.

See supra note 29.

35. See infra notes 55-69 and accompanying text.
36. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
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between foreign
and domestic markets, promoting efficient capital formation on a
38
global basis.

These arguments assume that a reduction of U.S. disclosure requirements

will cause an increase in the use of U.S. markets by foreign issuers. Although
no empirical data exist on the effect of disclosure requirement concessions,

there is some evidence of rises since 1982 in the dollar volume of debt and
equity issuances by foreign companies in the United States.

These rises,

however, may be explicable in purely economic and financial terms.3 9 The
disclosure reforms have narrowed the information gap between the United
States and other countries, as have reforms upgrading the disclosure required
in Britain and elsewhere. 40 Yet, very significant and inconvenient differences
remain, especially regarding reconciliation of foreign accounts with U.S.
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), where segment reporting
remains one of several bones of contention. 4 ' Therefore, it may remain
generally true that the disclosure reforms have not had much effect, and
foreign issuers who trade in the U.S. capital markets do so in spite of the
regulatory regime rather than because of it.42 This result suggests that if the
encouragement to foreign issuers approach is to be taken seriously, more
concessions will be required from the Commission. The arguments in favor
of this approach will have to be weighty to overcome the disposition towards a
uniform system, and so those arguments must be scrutinized.
Point (a) sets out the case for investing in foreign securities in order to
diversify risk.4 3 Evidence that foreign securities have frequently out38. Contrast the current limited developments, supra note 12.
39. For a summary indicating increases in debt and equity offerings in the United States in 1983,
see Release No. 21,958, supra note 4, at 87,383-87.
40. See The Stock Exchange (Listing) Regulations, 1984 (U.K.). For a general discussion of the
effects of disclosure requirements, see Carmichael, Listing Eurobonds in London, 4 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 32
(1985); Posen, InternationalSecurities Markets: Comparative Disclosure Requirements, 3J. COMP. CORP. L. &
SEC. REG. 392 (1981).

41. The segmented reporting requirement has produced substantial research literature in the
United States. See Ajinkya, An Empirical Evaluation of Line-of-Business Reporting, 18 J. ACCT. REs. 343
(1980); Baldwin, Segment Earnings Disclosure and the Ability of Securities Analysts to Forecast Earnings Per
Share, 59 ACCT. REV. 376 (1984); Mohr, The Segmental ReportingIssue: A Review of EmpiricalResearch, 2J.
AccT. LITERATURE 39 (1983). This literature supports the view that decisions can be influenced
beneficially by the availability of segmental data. However, studies examining the cost of segmental
disclosure are inconclusive. See Mohr, supra, at 63-64. Cost of compliance seems to be the main
problem for foreign issuers, and their particular case has yet to be subjected to full empirical analysis.
Other controversial accounting questions relate to the use of the last-in-first-out (LIFO) cost flow
assumption, expensing of research and development costs, valuation of fixed assets, accounting for
pensions, and (perhaps to a diminishing extent) foreign currency translation. See generally Release
No. 6,568, supra note 4, at 87 (references to the SEC staff's comparative disclosure survey).
42. See Nathan, Special Problems Arising as a Result of Trading in Multiple Markets, 4J. COMP. CORP. L.
& SEC. REG. 1 (1982). According to Nathan, foreign issuers "are concerned that they will be caught
up in a disclosure system over which they have no control ....
[A]II it [the foreign issuer] cares about
is staying away from the SEC and the SEC's disclosure system." Id. at 8. This article is a legal
practitioner's account of clients' attitudes and is necessarily impressionistic, but has an air of
plausibility. One hopes that empirical research will eventually provide us with better evidence.
43. There is a large amount of literature on the use of foreign securities to diversify risk. See,
e,g., Agmon & Lessard, Investor Recognition of Corporate International Diversification, 32 J. FIN. 1049
(1977).
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performed U.S. securities supports this argument. 4 4 Thus, it is fair to assume
that U.S. investors will deal in foreign securities-"the issue is not
whether . .. but where they will purchase such securities." 4 5 It will become
progressively less true, however, that the execution speed of orders and the
transaction costs for U.S. investors will be significantly reduced by opening up
U.S. markets to foreign issuers, particularly where the foreign security is listed
on the London Stock Exchange. This situation is due to the removal of
barriers in London against entry by U.S. securities firms and the reduction of
the stamp duty. 46 If foreign issuers are driven away from U.S. markets, U.S.
investors will simply use the services of a multinational securities firm for
trading overseas. The real losers might be the smaller securities firms whose
size prevents them from operating multinationally. The argument thus
becomes one about the welfare of small broker-dealers, and about
competitiveness in that segment of the market.
If foreign issuers were really attracted to U.S. markets under a regime
which provides less disclosure than domestic U.S. issuers (although much
more than they would otherwise make), then it would necessarily be true that
U.S. investors would have more information about those issuers than they
would have if trading overseas. The weakness of this argument may be in its
premise, for it is probable that foreign issuers will in fact be discouraged from
using United States markets because of the extra disclosure which they would
be required to make upon entry. There exists another aspect of the
information question, however. If a foreign security is listed on a U.S. stock
exchange or (more probably) NASDAQ, there will be increased incentives for
financial analysts to study that security. It stands to reason that the more
popular the security becomes, the greater this incentive and consequently, the
higher the likelihood that the market will obtain the information needed to
assess the security. If the security is not traded on U.S. markets, this pressure
to develop an analysis of the stock will be confined to the specialist or larger
securities firms. Given the strength and depth of the financial services sector
in the United States, entry of a foreign security into the U.S. markets is likely
to expand considerably the attention given to the security by U.S. brokers and
analysts. Consequently, the quantity and quality of information about the
stock and the issue will also expand. Thus it is beneficial, in terms of
increasing the information available to U.S. investors, to encourage foreign
investors to enter U.S. markets.
Ultimately, the question raised by point (a) does not concern the
desirability of encouraging foreign issuers; rather, it is the securities
regulator's traditional question about the best way of benefiting investors.
Evaluations must direct attention to the recurrent questions of fire
prevention, rather than the regulation of the safety match. It is rational to
44.
45.
46.

See Thomas, Internationalizationof the Securities Markets, supra note 5, at 164.
Thomas, Can the SEC Help?, supra note 29, at 58.
See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
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conclude that U.S. investors will benefit if steps are taken which increase
trading of foreign securities on U.S. markets.
Point (b) sets out the case for equal treatment. A foreign issuer seeking to
comply with U.S. domestic disclosure requirements may be forced to engage
U.S. accountants and auditors, and to dig up information which its normal
accounting records would not contain. 47 The cost of doing this could be high.
The U.S. domestic issuer, geared to U.S. disclosure requirements, accounting
procedures, and financial standards, will have a compliance system in place.
Accordingly, to impose the same disclosure requirements upon foreign issues
would effectively discriminate against foreign issuers.
It would be difficult to sustain at a theoretical level the proposition that
foreign issuers have a civil right to equal treatment. Yet, at an empirical level,
point (b) has substance. For example, it seems plausible to say that the costs
of compliance with U.S. regulations are higher for foreign issuers than for
domestic issuers and that this higher cost discourages the use of U.S. markets.
Of course, the domestic issuer might reply that the encouragement to foreign
issuers approach will impose more disclosure on itself than on foreign issuers
who may be its business competitors. Thus, the additional disclosure might
give the foreign issuer a direct competitive advantage. 4 8 However, if this is
true, it is true whether the foreign business competitor raises capital in the
United States, or stays out of the U.S. capital markets while nevertheless
collecting all publicly-disclosed information about its U.S. competitor. The
domestic issuer's point would be met more effectively by lowering the level of
U.S. domestic disclosure than by raising the level of foreign issuer disclosure.
In the end, consideration of this argument leads to a review of whether
certain ingredients of current U.S. domestic disclosure policy are necessary.
If the extra U.S. requirements are really necessary for the protection of U.S.
investors, it would be improper to excuse an issuer using U.S. markets from
full compliance. If the extra requirements are not necessary, what is the
justification for insisting on them at all? Once again, we have returned to a
question of basic investor protection-fire prevention rather than regulation
of the safety match.
Point (c) addresses competition between U.S. markets and the
Euromarkets. It could be argued that U.S. regulation (especially banking
regulation) has been instrumental in the dramatic increase in use of the
Euromarkets during the last fifteen years. 49 The argument hints that with a
less severe U.S. regulatory regime most of the enormous volume of Eurobond
and Euronote business would have been transacted in the United States, and
that U.S. deregulation will bring the business onshore. An evaluation of this
argument turns upon the significance of high disclosure requirements as a
47. See supra note 41.
48. Conversely, of course, the foreign issuer's foreign competitors may be given an advantage to
the extent that the disclosure required of the foreign issuer by the SEC exceeds the disclosure
required by the foreign jurisdiction.
49. See Harfield, supra note 32, at 582-90.
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disincentive to market use, relative to other factors such as yield, risk, and tax.
50
As yet, the evidence is sketchy and impressionistic.
The competition argument is reminiscent of the much-debated race to the
bottom in U.S. state corporate regulation. 5 1 It might be contended, as critics of
the Delaware Code have argued, 52 that competition between legal systems will
lead to a decline in the protection of those interests which the law exists to
serve. It might be argued that, to the contrary, competition between legal
systems will cause protective standards to be set at their optimal level. 53 In
the international context, establishing a uniform code will be even more
difficult than achieving federal uniformity of U.S. corporation laws. It does
not necessarily follow, however, that the international competitive pressure to
reduce disclosure standards should be resisted at all costs. International
competition is less manageable than domestic interstate competition, and one
may speculate that information technology is likely to raise international
competitive intensity over time. If, therefore, disclosure requirements are
shown to affect the listing decisions of issuers, it may become necessary to
reduce U.S. requirements in the interests of U.S. investors and U.S. markets.
Again, the old theme of securities regulation emerges: promoting efficient
markets and investor protection.
The emergence of this theme leads to (d), which relates to the need for
international minimum disclosure standards. If the SEC were able to set
disclosure standards at a level which both adequately protected investors and
was more attractive to foreign issuers than foreign alternatives, those
standards would soon be accepted internationally as the norm for
standardization. To the extent that foreign issuers and regulators perceive
U.S. disclosure requirements as much more onerous than necessary, it will be
impracticable to set an international disclosure standard approaching the U.S.
level. Once again, there arises the question of whether the current U.S.
disclosure requirements, to the extent that they go beyond the levels
generally accepted elsewhere, really are necessary for the protection of U.S.
investors.
To summarize, tucked behind the arguments supporting the encouragement
to foreign issuers approach are some good arguments favoring the relaxation of
U.S. disclosure requirements in order to benefit U.S. investors and strengthen
U.S. capital markets. The cumulative effect of the arguments is to require that
the Commission reassess the elements of U.S. disclosure requirements which
50.

See supra notes 32, 42.

51. There is also a degree of competition between the SEC, which regulates financial options,
and the CFTC, which regulates financial futures. Langevoort, supra note 18, at 762.
See Cary, Federalism and CorporateLaw: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
In the corporate law context, see R. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION 9-11
(1978); Dodd & Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy Competition" vs. Federal
Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259 (1980); Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent
Developments in Delaware's Corporation Laws, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 913 (1982). Note especially the
perspicacious analysis in Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, I J. L. ECON.
52.

53.

& ORGANIZATION

225 (1985). See also R.

GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE AcQUISITIONS

1077 (1986) (comment on the Romano article).
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take the United States beyond the disclosure levels acceptable in such
countries as the United Kingdom. In the end, the reassessment depends on
empirical questions. If the system would work from day to day as effectively
without as with a particular disclosure requirement for foreign issuers, and
removal would encourage increased use of U.S. markets by foreign issuers,
then the case for removing that item becomes irresistible. Because these
empirical hypotheses are difficult to test in the abstract, and because there is
so much to be gained if the hypotheses turn out to be true, the Commission
might try an evolutionary, guardedly experimental approach. Perhaps the
Commission, having identified the disclosure requirements which foreign
issuers complain about most, could remove all or some of them for a trial
period. The Commission could even confine the experiment initially to
world-class issuers and non-convertible debt offerings. It might be
appropriate to revise the definition of world-class issuer, so that lower-rated
or smaller issuers could "insure up" to the standard with domestic insurers.
The experiment would require monitoring to determine, as far as possible,
the effect of the concessions on issuing and trading patterns. The object
should be to meet the arguments set out above by progressively achieving a
substantial reduction of disclosure standards for foreign issuers on the
controversial accounting and other questions which seem to be causing
difficulty at present. 54 Eventually the same standards might perhaps be
applied to domestic issuers. No obvious justification exists for treating the
very modest 1979-82 reforms as a satisfactory settlement.
B.

Integrated Disclosure

From 1979 to 1983, the Commission extensively changed the rules
governing disclosure by foreign issuers under the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 55 In
public releases, the SEC made strenuous efforts to justify the changes by
recourse to general policies and principles. Practical and workable ideas were
liable to be rejected if the Commission found them to lack a theoretical
basis.

56

What were the policies and principles generating change?

For

simplicity's sake, the following discussion will be confined to non-North
American private issuers, and will disregard the special arrangements
affecting Canadian, Mexican, and foreign government issues.
Three principal changes altered the level of disclosure for foreign issuers.
First, in 1979, the Commission overhauled the content of annual reports filed
by foreign issuers under the 1934 Act, and introduced Form 20-F. 5 7 That
54. See supra note 41.
55. Foreign Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 6,493, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 83,435 (Oct. 6, 1983) [hereinafter Release No. 6,493].
56. Thus, various suggested alternatives to the controversial 1983 amendments to Rule 12g3-2,
restricting the information-supplying exemption from the section 12 (g) registration requirement,
were rejected by the Commission partly because of "the lack of any specific theoretical basis for a
particular test." Release No. 6,493, supra note 55.
57. Rules, Registration and Annual Report Form for Foreign Private Issuers, Exchange Act
Release No. 16,371, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,363 (Nov. 29, 1979)
[hereinafter Release No. 16,371 ].
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form was similar to the standard form for domestic issuers (Form 10-K) but
58
allowed for differences in some important respects.
Second, in 1982, an integrated system of disclosure was introduced, which
corresponded with the integrated system for domestic issuers. 5 9 The new
arrangements introduced three registration documents for filings under the
1933 Act, called Forms F-1, F-2, and F-3.6 0

Finally, from 1979 to 1982 a series of revisions refined the content of
Form 20-F. 6 1 As a result, disclosure by foreign issuers under Form 20-F (and
hence under the integrated system) differs from disclosure by domestic
issuers in four main respects.
First, there are significant accounting
differences. Foreign issuers are permitted to use financial statements
prepared in accordance with their country's accounting principles, but they
must quantify any material differences between their financial statements and

figures which would have been reached using Regulation S-X and U.S.
GAAP.

62

Further (subject to the exception noted below), they must reconcile

their financial statements to Regulation S-X and U.S. GAAP by providing
63
information on various matters including full segment reporting.

The second difference applies only to two sub-groups of foreign issuers,
namely certain issuers of highly-rated non-convertible debt securities and

issuers of rights offerings to shareholders and employees. These issuers enjoy
an exception to the requirement that foreign accounts be reconciled to
Regulation S-X and U.S. GAAP. 64 The main significance of the exception is
that it permits debt and rights issuers to avoid full segment reporting-that is,
the disclosure of profits, revenues, and assets for each geographic and
industry segment. 65 U.S. GAAP requires such disclosure, but foreign GAAP
normally requires segment reporting of revenues only. 66 Nevertheless, if a
sector's revenue contributions differ materially from its profit contributions,
58. Id.
59. See Integrated Disclosure System for Foreign Private Issuers, Exchange Act Release No.
6,360, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,054 (Nov. 20, 1981) [hereinafter
Release No. 6,360].
60. A foreign issuer using Form F-3, which can be used for all types of securities offerings except
exchange offers, can incorporate by reference the information contained in the 1934 Act's Form 20F. The issuer must deliver Form 20-F on request. To qualify to use Form F-3 the issuer (called
loosely a "world class issuer") must have filed reports under the 1934 Act throughout the preceding
36 months and at least $300 million of its voting stock must be held by non-affiliates. The latter
prerequisite does not apply to issuers of highly-rated non-convertible debt securities. Issuers using
Form F-2 may attach Form 20-F to the F-2 prospectus, instead of repeating all of the information in
both documents. Like Form F-3, Form F-2 may be used for all securities offerings except exchange
offers. Form F-2 is available to a foreign issuer which has either filed under the 1934 Act throughout
the preceding 36 months or has so filed only once and has at least $300 million of voting stock held
by non-affiliates. All other foreign issuers (and all foreign issuers making exchange offers) must use
Form F-i, which requires full and detailed disclosure.
61. See Release No. 16,371, supra note 56; Release No. 6,360, supra note 59. See also Thomas,
Increased Access, supra note 29.
62. Release No. 6360, supra note 59, at 84,647.
63. Id. at 84,648.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. See also Release No. 6,568, supra note 4, at 87,322.
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the issuer must give a narrative explanation relating segment revenue to total
operating profits. 6 7 The third difference concerns directors' remuneration,
which may be disclosed in aggregate rather than, as in the case of domestic
issuers, for each individual director, unless individual remuneration has
previously been disclosed to shareholders or to the public. Directors'
interests in certain transactions must be disclosed only if they have been
previously disclosed to shareholders or the public. 6 8

Fourth, foreign issuers may use financial statements up to six months old
(twelve months for certain offerings to shareholders), as opposed to 135 days
in the case of domestic issuers, although more current information must be
69
supplied if it has been issued pursuant to foreign law.

How did the SEC justify these changes? To a considerable extent,
integration of 1933 and 1934 Act forms was just a matter of keeping foreign
issuers in step with domestic issuers, for whom an integrated system had
already been planned. 70 What is interesting is the way in which the
Commission was prepared to differentiate between foreign and domestic
issuers on the question of disclosure content. Indeed, this differentiation
represented a change of heart by the Commission, which had in 1977
proposed a disclosure form for foreign issuers which would basically have
required that they follow the rules applicable to domestic issuers. 7'
The Commission's stated justification for the changes was a curious one.
Originally it had given qualified support to the encouragement to foreign issuers
approach when it promulgated Form 20-F. 7 2 In 1981, however, it professed

that it endorsed neither the encouragement to foreign issuers approach nor the
identical disclosure approach, preferring instead to balance the competing
policies by using a principle of voluntarism:
[T]he more voluntary steps a foreign company has taken to enter the United States
capital markets, the degree of regulation and amount of disclosure more closely
73
approaches the degree of regulation of domestic registrants.

This comment is very puzzling. The principle of voluntarism is the
Commission's basis for determining whether a foreign issuer whose securities
are traded in U.S. markets should be required to file reports under the 1934
Act. 74 Such a principle is not appropriate support for a graduated scale of
regulation. Nor do the changes in the level of disclosure for foreign issuers
during the period from 1979 to 1982 actually reflect the policy contained in
this quotation. The integrated system has introduced degrees of disclosure
by recognizing three classes of foreign issuers for the purpose of entitlements
to use Forms F-3 and F-2. The classification is based on the size of the issuer
67.
68.
69.
70.

Release No. 6360, supra note 59, at 84,648.
See Form 20-F, Item 11, 4 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,754 (1985).
See Form 20-F, Items 17, 18, 4 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,757-58 (1985).
Release No. 6,360, supra note 59, at 84,644.

71. See Posen, InternationalSecurities Alarkets, supra note 40, at 209; Thomas, Extraterria-alitY,in an
Era, supra note 29, at 469.

72.
73.
74.

Release No. 16,371, supra note 57.
Release No. 6,360, supra note 59.
See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.

Page 221: Summer 1987]

INTERNATIONALIZATION OF SECURITIES MARKETS

and its familiarity to U.S. markets, rather than the number of "voluntary
steps" which the issuer has taken to enter the U.S. capital markets. Has the
Commission implicitly elected to take the encouragement to foreign issuers
approach by the very acts of introducing the reforms of 1979 to 1982? If so, it
has watered down its decision without recourse to any rational principle by
accommodating foreign issuers far less completely than it might have done.
C.

The Reach of Disclosure Laws and the Information-Supplying
Exemption

In addition to the contention over levels of disclosure, the early 1980's
also saw debate on the question of the reach of the U.S. disclosure laws. The
registration requirements of the 1933 Act apply to the offer or sale of any
security involving the use of interstate commerce or the mails. Section 2(7)
defines "interstate commerce" to include "trade or commerce in securities or
any transportation or communication relating thereto .

.

. between any

foreign country and any State, Territory or the District of Columbia."
Furthermore, unless exempted the foreign issuer must file under the 1934 Act
if it has previously offered securities in the United States, has securities listed
on a U.S. exchange, or has more than 500 shareholders and $300 million in
assets. The main relevant exemptions to the 1934 Act reporting requirements
are contained in Rule 12g3-2(a) and (b). Rule 12g3-2(a) provides an
exception where fewer than 300 shareholders of the foreign issuer reside in
the United States. Rule 12g3-2(b), the "information-supplying" exemption,
allows the foreign issuer to avoid filing under section 12 (g) if the issuer
supplies the Commission with copies of documents made publicly available
overseas. Rule 12g3-2(b) was controversially amended in 1983 to remove the
exemption in cases where the foreign securities (or ADRs representing them)
75
are quoted on NASDAQ
In developing its rules about exemption for foreign issuers, the
Commission has applied a principle of voluntarism. According to the
Commission, Rule 12g3-2(b), adopted in 1967 before the start of the
automated quotation system, was intended to exempt from registration
foreign issuers whose securities were traded in the United States without any
voluntary action by the issuer. 7 6 It was possible at one stage for foreign
securities to be included in NASDAQ without the participation of the issuer,
but for some time the approach of NASDAQ has been to require that the
issuer's consent be obtained. In its 1983 revision of the rule, the Commission
concluded (notwithstanding overwhelming opposition by respondents to the
Release in which the proposal was made) that foreign issuers which consent to
75. See Release No. 6,493, supra note 55.
76. Securities or ADRs which enjoyed the exemption on October 5, 1983 were "grandfathered."
See Exchange Act Rule 12g3-2(d)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(d)(3) (1987). For present purposes, it is
unnecessary to distinguish between the foreign securities themselves and the American Depository
Receipts which are usually created to simplify trading and settlement. As to ADRs, see Royston, The
Regulation of American Depositor, Receipts: Amencanization of the International Capital Markets, 10 N.C.J.
INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 87 (1985).
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the quotation of their securities on NASDAQ should be treated as voluntarily
seeking U.S. trading markets, and hence should be denied the exemption
from filing. Two supplementary justifications for the change were also given:
(1) that some Canadian issuers had misused the exemption, and (2) that there
should be no undue differences between disclosure requirements for U.S. and
77
foreign issuers.
The 1983 decision has been strongly criticized. 78 The principle of
voluntarism has about it the air of technical lawyering. It proceeds from the
premise that because both are, strictly speaking, cases of voluntary action, the
consequences previously attached to the active seeking out of U.S. markets
must now extend to mere consent to another's application to use those
markets. Worse still, the principle of voluntarism is a diversion from the
central regulatory questions which the Commission had addressed just a year
earlier. 79 The reasoning which supports the 1983 decision never directly
refers to the interests of U.S. investors in having domestic access to foreign
securities, although the 1982 decision on integrated disclosure considered it
one balancing factor.8 0 The 1982 decision also attempted to take into account
the foreign issuer's difficulties in meeting domestic disclosure requirements,
but the 1983 decision attempts to eliminate undue differences of disclosure
standards for domestic and foreign issuers. 8 ' The word undue avoids direct
inconsistency with the 1982 Release, but does not fully disguise a tension
between the 1982 and 1983 decisions. In 1982, the principle of voluntarism led
the Commission to the view that the degree of disclosure should rise in
proportion to the extent of the issuer's voluntary entry into U.S. markets. We
have seen that this approach was not in fact applied in 1982.82 In the 1983
decision this approach appears to have been abandoned, for it would have led
the Commission to conclude that mere consent to NASDAQ quotation was a
tiny step justifying a degree of disclosure significantly less than a Form 20-F.
An attempt could be made to justify the 1983 decision through reasoning
which the Commission did not in fact employ. The Commission has a certain
responsibility to maintain a level playing field between NASDAQ and the
stock exchanges. If a foreign issuer lists on an exchange, it becomes a
reporting company, but if it allows its shares or ADRs to be quoted on
NASDAQ, it would have been exempt from reporting before 1983. The pre1983 exemption would accordingly mean that competitors (NASDAQand the
stock exchanges) would be treated differently by the law. However, because a
foreign company must necessarily be more actively involved when it seeks
77. Release No. 6,493, supra note 55.
78. See, e.g., The (London) Stock Exchange, Comments on U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission Concept Release No. 33-6568, at 6-7 (Aug. 2, 1985) (available in the office of Law and
Contemporary Problems). But see Buxbaum, Securities Regulation and the Foreign Issuer Exemption: . Study in
the Process of Accommodating Foreign Interests, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 358 (1968).
79. Release No. 6,360, supra note 59.

80. Id.
81.
82.

Release No. 6,493, supra note 55.
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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stock exchange listing than when it consents to the quoting of its shares on
NASDAQ, a good case exists for treating NASDAQ differently from the stock
exchanges. Furthermore, it is far from self-evident that equal treatment of
NASDAQ and the stock exchanges should be achieved by raising mandatory
disclosure on NASDAQ rather than by reducing the level of disclosure
required of foreign issuers seeking a stock exchange listing.
It would be interesting to know the effect of the 1983 decision on
applications for new quotations of foreign securities on NASDAQ. One
would expect that they would be reduced, especially in cases where quotation
is sought primarily for the convenience of U.S. shareholders. However, the
83
evidence is inconclusive.
The arguments supporting the encouragement to foreign issuers approach to
the question of levels of disclosure apply mutatis mutandis to the question of
exemption for NASDAQ-quoted foreign securities. 8 4 Ultimately, it may be
rational to reduce the disclosure requirement for foreign issuers and
simultaneously remove the exemption. Until the former step is taken,
however, the information-supplying exemption is needed.
IV
UNITED STATES ISSUERS IN FOREIGN CAPITAL MARKETS-A CASE
FOR QUALIFYING THE EXTRATERRITORIAL EXTENSION OF
THE REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS OF THE
SECURITIES ACT OF

1933

There are, of course, many contexts in which questions may arise about
the extraterritorial reach of U.S. securities laws. Much of the debate has
concentrated on the scope of the insider trading and market manipulation
laws, 8 5 although problems also arise from the disclosure requirements
concerning acquisitions

of corporate

control. 86

In order to make this

discussion manageable and to integrate it with the rest of this article, attention
83. The number of British companies whose shares are traded in ADR form on NASDAQ rose
from eleven at the end of 1984 to seventeen by Feb. 28, 1986. See ECONOMIST, Mar. 29, 1986, at 86.
Further study would be needed before any conclusions could be drawn as to the regulatory effect of
the 1983 decision. The same magazine report notes the British budget decision to impose a five
percent tax on the "conversion" of shares in British companies into American Depository Receipts.
The objective was apparently to encourage investors to buy British shares in Britain. It was highly
controversial and was subsequently reversed.
84. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
85. See Marano, Extraterritorial Application of the Antifraud hovisions of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 2 INT'L TAX & Bus. L. 298 (1983); Morgenstern, ExtraterritorialApplication of '.S. Securities Law:A
Matrix Analysis, 7 HASTINGS INT'L COMP. L. REV. 1 (1983); Norton, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction of C.S.
Antitrust and Securities Laws, 28 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 597 (1979); Thomas, ExtraterritorialApplication,
supro note 29; Thomas, Extraterritoriality in an Era, supra note 29 (an expanded version of the
preceding article); Note, Regulation of Offshore Investment Companies Through E.xtrateri-torial Applicatioii of
Rule lOb-5, 1982 DUKE L.J. 167; Note, Expanding the Jurisdictional Basis for Transnational Securities Fraud
Cases: 4 11inimal Conduct Approach, 6 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 308 (1982); Note, Offshore Funds and Rule 10b5: An InternationalLaw Approach to Extraterritorial Jurisdiction under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 8
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 396 (1984); Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of the Federal Securities Lan's: The Aeedfor
Reassessment, 14J. Irr'L L. & ECON. 529 (1980).
86. Fedders, Waiver by Conduct, supra note 28, at 5.
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will be confined to the SEC's administration of the registration requirements
of the 1933 Act with respect to extraterritorial offers and sales of the
securities of a U.S. issuer. What attitude should the SEC take if unregistered
87
U.S. securities are issued or traded offshore?
It is worth noting again that this article focuses on administrative rather
than curial problems; it addresses the question of the SEC's attitude or policy
as a regulator, not the judicial definition of the principles of extraterritoriality.
Of course, if the courts refuse to extend a U.S. securities law far enough to
reach a foreign transaction, they necessarily limit the SEC's powers and
functions as well as rights of civil plaintiffs. The converse is not true,
however, for even if a securities law applies to a certain foreign transaction as
a matter of law, the SEC still has a degree of choice as to whether to enforce it.
Broadly speaking, there are two approaches open to the Commission.
They will be called the nexus approach and the balancingapproach. The nexus
approach is the administrative equivalent of the judicial approach, which
prevailed until recently, to issues of extraterritorial jurisdiction.8 " If the SEC
adopted this approach, it would resolve to require registration whenever a
certain territorial nexus (or one of a stated list) existed, without regard to the
presence of any other influences. An example of this approach would be to
require registration if and only if the securities are offered or sold to an
American national. In contrast, the balancing approach precludes the SEC
from using any universal rule to determine policy.8 9 This approach asserts
that there are too many pertinent variables, and requires a balancing of all
relevant circumstances in each case. The only guiding principles are the
promotion of efficient U.S. markets (often not relevant in this context) and the
protection of U.S. investors.
The balancing approach is preferable, somewhat by default. The main
difficulty with the nexus approach is how to identify a criterion or criteria
which is or are adequate to distinguish those transactions which should be
regulated from those which should not.
Suppose that the SEC were to say, "We expect registration in all cases
involving securities of a U.S. issuer, whoever trades and wherever they trade."
The effect would be to hobble U.S. issuers in the Euromarkets, where the
opportunity to take advantage of a window in the market may well depend on
making a very swift issue. 90 Alternatively, the Commission may decide to
require registration whenever the securities are sold to U.S. nationals. That
approach may induce the persons responsible for the issue or selling to
exclude U.S. investors entirely, in order to avoid registration. In an effort to
protect U.S. investors, the SEC would have achieved an arrangement in which
87. The SEC's policy may be thwarted because of difficulties of investigation and enforcement,
such as the problems posed by foreign secrecy and blocking laws. But problems of investigation and
enforcement will not be discussed in this essay. For a discussion of these problems, see sources cited
supra note 28.
88. See Norton, supra note 85.
89. See Thomas, ExtraterritorialitV in an Era, supra note 29, at 459-60.
90. See Nathan, supra note 42, at 229.

Page 221: Summer 1987]

INTERNATIONALIZATION

OF SECURITIES MARKETS

U.S. investors would be deprived entirely of an investment opportunity which
may be economically advantageous.
It is arguable that these problems can be avoided by making the principal
nexus the place .of the sale transaction. If the securities have settled outside
the United States, U.S. nationals who go offshore to buy them should not look
to the SEC for protection. The Commission has taken an approach like this,
91
The
consistent with its general preference for principles over pragmatism.

Commission's pronouncements should be investigated before an assessment
of this approach is attempted.
Although the definition of interstate commerce 92 might be construed to
encompass virtually any offering of securities made by a domestic issuer to
foreign investors, the SEC has stated that it will not take enforcement action
for failure to register securities if the distribution is effected in a manner
which will result in the securities coming to rest abroad. 9 3 This test would not
be met, said the Commission, in a distribution through facilities of Canadian
stock exchanges or in a distribution specifically directed toward American
nationals abroad (including servicemen). 9 4 Apart from such situations,
however, the registration provisions will not be enforced "so long as the
offering is made under circumstances reasonably designed to preclude
distribution or redistribution of the securities within, or to nationals of, the
United States," even if the offering originates in the United States, involves
U.S. broker-dealers, and the mechanics of distribution are effected within the
95
United States.
The coming to rest abroad principle has been worked out by the Commission
in the process of considering requests for no-action letters. Issuers who have
received favorable responses to requests for no-action letters have taken
precautions such as the following. Legends have been placed in the offering
circular and on the securities sold in the offering, stating that the securities
have not been registered under the 1933 Act and are not being offered for
sale in the United States or to its nationals. 96 The legend also states that the
securities may not be transferred within ninety days after the completion of
the offering, and thereafter may not be transferred in the United States or to
U.S. nationals unless the transaction is registered under the Act and any
applicable state act, or counsel certifies that an exemption is available. 9 7 One
commentator recommends that foreign investors be required to make
representations as to their residency and agree to abide by the transfer
restrictions, and that selling agents be required to agree to sell only to foreign
91. See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
92. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a2(7) (1982).
93. Statement of Securities and Exchange Commission relating to registration of foreign
offerings by domestic issuers and registration of underwriters of foreign offerings as broker-dealers,
17 C.F.R. § 231.4708 (1967).
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id.
Evans, Offerings of Securities Solely to Foreign Investors, 40 Bus. L. 69, 71 (1984).

97.

Id. at 72.
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investors. 98 The same commentator also suggests that closing should take
place outside the United States and that, as a safety net, the offering should be
structured to comply with the private offering exemption if possible. 9 9
Recently, however, the SEC staff appears to have adopted a benevolent
interpretation of the Commission's policy statement, and it might now be
satisfied with less severe precautions.1 0 0
When will the SEC permit securities offered or sold abroad to be resold in
the United States or to U.S. citizens? It seems, on the basis of interpretations
of the Commission's rule by its staff, that foreign investors who are not
affiliated with the issuer and who have beneficially owned the securities for
three years may sell at any time and in any manner-even where the issuer is a
0
non-reporting company.1
The first and most obvious comment to be made about the Commission's
policy is that it has generated some extraordinary boilerplate in Eurodollar
documentation and, especially if the views of the more cautious U.S. counsel
are followed, has probably added significantly to the cost of U.S. issuer
Eurofunding.10 2 To what effect? Either U.S. investors wish to purchase these
securities or they do not. If they do, it is hard to believe that documentary
incantations will defeat their ingenuity, and if they do not, what is the point of
03
the policy?'
Second, it seems ironic that one of the main day-to-day consequences of
the Commission's approach has been to deprive U.S. investors of some very
real advantages. Judging by their popularity in recent times, Eurobonds and
Euronotes appear to have been a notably successful form of investment in
terms of yield, liquidity, and the efficiency of issue and transaction
procedures. When the securities are listed on a stock exchange such as
98. Id. at 72-76.
99. Id. at 75; see also Henderson, supra note 8, at 26; Nathan, supra note 42.
100. Klegerman, Offshore Resale Option, 4 INr'L FIN. L. REV. 38 (1985) (referring to the SEC
interpretive letter to Trilogy Resource Corporation, SEC Interpretive Letter (Aug. 3, 1984)
(WESTLAW, SEC No-Action Letters database) and the SEC No-Action Letter to Silverton
Resources, Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 4, 1985) (WESTLAW, SEC No-Action Letters
database)). In InfraRed Associates, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Sept. 11, 1985) (WESTLAW, SEC
No-Action Letters database), the SEC regarded it as sufficient (after a 12-month lock-up) that the
transaction be executed on the London Stock Exchange. In First Interstate Bancorp, SEC No-Action
Letter (March 15, 1985) (WESTLAW, SEC No-Action Letters database), the SEC was influenced by
the fact that the securities were short term notes that would not be rolled over.
101. Evans, supra note 96, at 80.
102. The inconvenience of a now-superseded procedure whereby each bond purchaser received
his own temporary certificate, replaced by a definitive certificate after ninety days had elapsed, must
have been prodigious. See Nathan, supra note 42, at 228. Cigna Corporation, which has numerous
insurance subsidiaries operating wholly outside the United States, has recently found it necessary to
obtain an SEC no-action letter to enable those subsidiaries which are branches of U.S.-formed
companies to invest in securities issued by non-U.S. companies outside the United States.
Underwriters had refused to sell to Cigna branches because of the standard restrictions of their
underwriting agreements. See Cigna Corp., Letter to SEC (Jan. 17, 1986) (WESTLAW, SEC NoAction Letter database).
103. The discussants to Nathan's paper expressed the opinion that Eurobonds and notes are
designed to be attractive to European investors and that flow-back into the United States was not a
practical problem. Nathan, supra note 42, at 228.
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London or Luxembourg and accepted for clearance through Euro-clear or
Cedel S.A., the level of investor protection is not insubstantial, because the
investor will have access to an offering circular which conforms to the
disclosure requirements of the European Economic Community's Sixth
Directive for the Harmonization of Company Law as well as to stock exchange
requirements. 0 4 Yet the Commission's approach (to the extent that it is
effective) deprives U.S. investors of access to that market until the expiration
of a seasoning period. The present point is really part of a larger issue
concerning the effects on U.S. investors of the extension of registration
requirements offshore. Foreign issuers with U.S. shareholders may feel
constrained to exclude the U.S. shareholders from rights offerings in order to
avoid U.S. registration requirements (which remain substantial for rights
issues notwithstanding the concessions made in the 1982 reforms).' 0 5 This is
a bizarre form of investor protection. Takeovers have highlighted this
tendency to exclude U.S. shareholders in order to avoid U.S. disclosure laws.
Thus, there is at least anecdotal evidence that a foreign bidder for control of a
foreign target which has U.S. shareholders will probably exclude U.S.
shareholders from the exchange offer component of its takeover bid, thereby
depriving them of the chance to participate in the combined venture.
Third, in view of the technological changes affecting securities firms and,
to a lesser extent, securities markets, it is becoming less and less sensible to
define the reach of securities regulation by recourse to a jurisdictional rule
about the physical location of trading. The physical location of transactions
should not be disregarded, but it must already be the case that some
internationally-traded securities do not come to rest in any significant sense at
all.
Fourth, the coming to rest abroad principle seems to exclude some highly
relevant factors from consideration. Two matters seem particularly pertinent.
First, the Commission should consider the expectations of the parties to a
transaction concerning the applicable securities regulation regime. Even
without the aide de memoire provided by the offering circular, parties transacting
a sale of Euronotes listed on the London Stock Exchange would surely not
expect U.S. law to apply, even if the issuer is a U.S. corporation. Second, the
Commission's approach does not take into account the presence or absence of
a directly-applicable foreign system of securities regulation, and the interest
of the foreign country in having its laws applied in a given situation.
Insistence by the Commission on a higher disclosure regime for a sub-group
of the securities traded on an overseas exchange may have a distorting effect
on the overseas market as a whole. Furthermore, it is hardly in the interests of
international comity for the SEC to take the view that a particular overseas
system of investor protection is inadequate, especially where (as in the case of
0 6
the United Kingdom) the system has recently been overhauled.
104.
105.
106.

See Welch, Breach of Prospectus Requirements, 6 COMPANY LAw. 247 (1985).
See supra notes 55-69 and accompanying text.
See supra note 22.
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The coming to rest abroad principle is flawed and should be replaced. But
with what? No other suitable nexus is in sight. It would be imprudent for the
Commission to adapt administratively the courts' conduct and effect tests. They
would extend the registration requirements too widely, and incidentally, play
havoc with Euromarket practices. There also exist signs that those tests are
coming to be regarded as unsatisfactory in their own context. 0 7 It is time for
the Commission to move from a nexus approach to a balancing approach.
In addressing the judicial approach to the extraterritorial application of
U.S. securities laws, former Commissioner Thomas has advocated such a new
test:
[T]he law, regulatory practices and national policies of all foreign nations which might
have an interest in a specific transnational securities transaction, rather than just the
conduct of the parties or the effect of their actions, should be carefully and explicitly
balanced before United States laws are applied extraterritorially. Specifically, the
relevant factors to be weighed by a court should include the location of the
transnational transaction, the domicile of the parties, the importance to each
interested country of having its laws applied in a given situation, the public policies of
such interested country that would be furthered by the application of its law, the
likelihood that another country will assert jurisdiction over the transaction,
and the
10 8
expectations of the parties with respect to the applicable governing laws.

With slight changes in the wording to reflect the fact that it would be an SEC
policy rather than a judicial doctrine, this quotation enunciates a sensible
balancing approach for the Commission to adopt regarding the reach of the
registration requirements of the 1933 Act. Indeed, the Commission is better
equipped than a court to handle such an approach, for its staff has the
flexibility to assess and reassess foreign policies and systems, and the
Commission may minimize the problem of uncertainty by issuing no-action
letters and concept releases.
Clearly, the Commission must not allow parties to an otherwise registrable
transaction to take it offshore solely to escape the registration requirements.
Where a new issue of securities occurs, however, using and complying with
the rules of a well-regulated foreign market, there should be no suggestion of
an SEC claim to regulation. The interests of U.S. investors would be well
served if the Commission made it clear now that it has no interest in enforcing
the registration requirements of the 1933 Act with respect to new issues by
any issuer in the Euro-debt markets, provided that the securities are listed
with the London, Luxembourg, or certain other stock exchanges, and are
accepted for clearance by a reputable clearing system.
V
SIMULTANEOUS NEW

MULTINATIONAL

EQUITY

OFFERINGS

On February 28, 1985, the Commission requested comments on some
proposed approaches to the facilitation of simultaneous equity issues in the
107.
108.

See sources cited supra note 85.
Thomas, Extraterritorialityin an Era, supra note 29, at 459-60.
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United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. 0 9 The release suggested
two alternative methods. First, the common prospectus approach would involve
settling a common form of disclosure document for use by multinational
issuers in all countries, and a common flotation procedure.' I Second, under
the reciprocal method, a statement or prospectus registered in the country of
domicile of the issuer would be recognized in the other two.
In addition to
requesting comments at large, the Commission asked seventeen specific
questions about these proposals, identifying some of the difficulties of
integration and hinting at possible solutions.' 12
Proposals for the harmonization and eventual integration of national
systems for regulating new equity issues were discussed in journals in the
early 1980's.' 3 In 1977, the British Petroleum Company Limited had made a
public offering of shares to raise over $900 million in the United Kingdom,
the United States, and Canada, but the offering was not quite simultaneous; it
had expired in Britain three days before it became effective in the United
States, and there was already an established market for BP's securities in each
country. In 1980, Tricentol, Ltd., a British company, made a $55 million
public offering of ADRs in the United States and Canada, but not in Britain.

Evidently, however, it was not until 1984 that the full range of practical
difficulties of complying simultaneously with the new-issue laws of several
countries came into focus, when some major British issuers attempted to
satisfy London and Washington (and in one case, Toronto and Tokyo as well)
at the same time, and found that their commercial objectives could be
achieved only by a frustratingly difficult procedure.' "4
A variety of motives may lead a foreign issuer to seek entry into the U.S.
capital markets. For instance, the issuer may wish to introduce itself to the
U.S. business community in order to establish product goodwill and facilitate
U.S. sales. If the U.S. investment community becomes familiar with its
securities, it may become feasible to finance the future acquisition of a U.S.
business by exchange of securities. The U.S. market may at the relevant time
be deeper and more buoyant than the markets of the issuer's country of
109.
110.
111.
112.

See Release No. 6,568, supra note 4.
Id. at 87,322.
Id.
Id. at 87,323.

113. Pierce, Regulation of Issuance and Trading of Securities in the United States and the European Economic
Community: A Comparison, 3J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 129 (1981); Thomas, Can the SEC Help?,
supra note 29, at 65; Williams & Spencer, Regulation of InternationalSecurities Markets: Towards Greater
Cooperation, 4 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 55 (1982). In Australia, the National Companies and

Securities Commission has expressed guarded willingness to permit prospectuses offering foreign
securities to be circulated in Australia, on a case by case basis. See Australian Company L. & Practice
(CCH) 90-911 (Feb. 19, 1986).
114. For information regarding the Reuters and British Telecom issues, see Pryor & Henderson,
Dual Public Offerings in the U.K. and the U.S., 4 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 16 (1985); Cooper, Euro-American
Multi-market Offerings of Equity Securities of Foreign Issuers (May 1985) (unpublished manuscript
presented to the Fourth Annual National Institute on Securities Regulation held May 29-31, 1985).
An adapted extract of the latter paper appears as an appendix to the American Bar Association
(section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law) submission dated July 15, 1985, to the SEC on
Release No. 6,568, supra note 4. This account relies partly on that extract.
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domicile. It is not as easy to see why an issuer would want to make an offering
of new securities simultaneously in several jurisdictions. In fact, the instances of
simultaneous offerings to date are so special they suggest that there may be
only a limited demand for simultaneous offerings. 1 5 In both the Reuters and
British Telecom issues, the companies wished to raise very large amounts,
approximately $300 million and $4.5 billion, respectively. There was some
doubt that the British capital market would be able to absorb the Reuters
issue, and overseas offerings of British Telecom were an obvious necessity.
Neither company had an existing international market for its securities.
Reuters had been a private company owned by newspaper proprietors and
British Telecom was a government instrumentality. There was a risk of claims
being made that the issues had extended into the United States in violation of
U.S. securities laws by virtue of the unavoidable international publicity which
both offerings would attract. Because of this, the best protection against such
a risk seemed to be to make the U.S. offering simultaneously with the U.K.
offering (and in British Telecom's case, simultaneously with offerings in
Canada and Japan). This is not to say that all simultaneous multinational
issues will be by enormous enterprises in spectacular circumstances.
Tricentol, Ltd. made a simultaneous offering in Canada and the United States
in 1980, although, with a total market capitalization of approximately $460
million, it must be considered relatively small.' 16 The circumstances were
again very special, and related to the need for a British oil and gas company to
gain swift entry into the business and financial markets of the huge and
sophisticated North American oil and gas sector.
Special circumstances will of course occur again. The British Conservative
Party's program of privatization of public instrumentalities will likely produce
several large offerings on a multinational and probably simultaneous basis,
including, perhaps, British Gas, British Airways, and Rolls Royce. There also
will be comparable cases in other countries. Unless the procedures of
simultaneous issues are made much less complicated than they are at present,
however, simultaneous new offerings will probably be exceptional.
The main barriers to simultaneous offerings should be briefly noted. First,
there are differences relating to underwriting and selling arrangements. In
the United Kingdom the securities are not offered to the public until a fixed or
minimum price is set, the final prospectus is registered, and the underwriting
agreement is signed." 17 The underwriter's commitment runs from that time.
The date of the offer to the public (the impact day) is determined well in
advance by the Government Broker's queue procedure, and cannot normally
be changed. The offer period is very short, typically about a week. Although
no offer to the public is permitted until the prospectus is registered, earlier
115.

Cooper, supra note 114.

116. Coles, Foreign Companies Raising Capital in the United States, 3 J. COMP.
300, 311-13 (1981).

CORP. L. & SEC. REG.

117. See Pryor & Henderson, supra note 114. The account of the U.K. and U.S. systems in this
paragraph is based on their article.
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private approaches can be made to investors (such as institutions), and the
company is permitted to run a limited advertising campaign during the offer
period. In the United States, the company first files a registration statement
including a preliminary prospectus, which is then circulated to prospective
investors and reviewed by the Commission and state Blue Sky authorities over
a period of several weeks. The prospective underwriter cannot begin to
market the offering until the Commission accepts the filing. Thereafter, the
underwriter may take indications of interest from investors but cannot
advertise in the British fashion. When the process of review is complete, the
issue is priced and the registration statement is made effective; the
underwriter's commitment arises only at that time.' 18
While these are formidable differences, an accommodation was arrived at
nevertheless in the Reuters and British Telecom issues. In the case of
Reuters, the British offer was an offer for sale by tender, the registered
prospectus stating only a minimum tender price. A fixed price was set
simultaneously in the United States and the United Kingdom after the
expiration of the U.K. offer period and the completion of the SEC and Blue Sky
review of the registration statement. The arrangements were not perfect,
because they left the U.S. underwriter with only thirteen business days for the
marketing of the issue in the United States and there would have been
difficulties accommodating changes in Britain if they had been necessitated by
the U.S. review.
In the case of British Telecom, the adoption by the United Kingdom of the
EEC's Sixth Directive on the Harmonization of Company Law made it feasible
for the company to file a pathfinder prospectus similar to the U.S. preliminary
prospectus, prior to the announcement of the offer price and the
commencement of the U.K. underwriter's risk. This made it possible to allow
three weeks for U.S. marketing and for accommodating changes to the
preliminary prospectus. Furthermore, the Bank of England acted in the novel
role of initial underwriter of a portion of the shares allocated to the overseas
offerings, transferring this commitment when the overseas underwriters were
ready to take it.19
While no standard or routine solution exists as yet, similar ad hoc
arrangements can be expected to be hammered out in future negotiations.
The differences in underwriting and selling present a serious problem but not
an insoluble one. Regulators could play a useful role as catalysts toward the
evolution of standard procedures. The regulators should be prepared (and
evidently the SEC is prepared 20 ) to pre-clear certain critical portions of the
prospectus. It would be premature, however, to respond to the underwriting
and selling problems by changing the regulatory apparatus.
The disclosure requirements of the United States raise a second barrier to
simultaneous offerings. We have already noted the Commission's position
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 16.
Id.
Id.
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regarding Form 20-F disclosure.121 The arguments presented above in favor
of making further concessions, in the interests of U.S. investors and U.S.
markets, carry through to the present context. In addition, there are some
further causes of dissension concerning the style and content of prospectuses.
In the United Kingdom, investors expect to see in the prospects section of the
prospectus some predictions by directors as to the future, and some
expression of optimism. The SEC, to the contrary, is disposed to emphasize
risks and discourage favorable predictions. Much the same contrast exists
regarding profit forecasts. 122 The qualified assertions in a U.S. prospectus
will appear gloomy to British readers. An illustration of this can be seen in
the SEC required statement that "although the Board believes the
assumptions [upon which a profit forecast is based] to be reasonable in the
light of the Company's operating experience in previous years, no assurance
23
can be given that the projected result will be realized."'
To the extent that these are merely differences of style, they are not a
substantial impediment to simultaneous offerings. If a compromise formula
cannot be worked out, then different styles can be adopted to suit each
investment community. To the extent that they constitute differences in
substantive disclosure requirements, they must be assessed in terms of the
arguments about disclosure and encouragement to foreign issuers which were
discussed above. 124 In a simultaneous offering, the issuer can hardly give an
optimistic profit forecast in the United Kingdom and a heavily qualified one in
the United States. If the issue is primarily directed to the United Kingdom
with an intention to top up the capital raising in the United States, the issuer
may prefer to abandon the U.S. markets rather than to run the risk that
enforced gloominess will prejudice the success of the issue in the United
Kingdom.
In summary, a set of minimum disclosure standards is needed, which offers
the kinds of general protections given by the European Sixth Directive and
Form 20-F, 12 5 but does not insist upon those controversial matters in which
the U.S. system extends beyond European standards. Purely as a matter of
practicality, it may be easier to introduce this by using the reciprocal rather than
the common prospectus technique.
The civil liability provisions for material misstatements in the prospectus
causes a third barrier. In the United States, the issuer has absolute liability
with respect to the information contained in the registration statement. 126 In
the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth, the statutory and
121.
122.
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See Pryor & Henderson, supra note 114, at 18.
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common law liability is more qualified, and litigation is infrequent. 12 7 Foreign
issuers will likely be apprehensive about the stricter U.S. liability. Fueling that
apprehension will be the knowledge that the United States is simply a more
28
litigious forum than Britain and the Commonwealth.
To a certain extent, the problem about prospectus liability is just an aspect
of the much wider question of the liability of foreign issuers and other foreign
actors for violations of U.S. securities laws. It would be hard to justify giving
foreign issuers who use the U.S. markets a general exemption from liability
for violations of the U.S. securities laws. A case exists, however, for creating a
narrowly defined safe-harbor protection for the issuer with respect to the
strict-liability rule of section 11129 and also with respect to market practices
which are standard in his home jurisdiction but which might be regarded as
illegal market manipulation under U.S. law.' 3 0 The safe harbor proposal
presents implementation difficulties. Statutory amendment of section 11 may
be out of the question as a practical matter. No administrative rules could
override the terms of section 11, but it may be possible to achieve the desired
objective by a rule which "defines" some crucial component of section 11,
such as the notion of materiality. Obviously, this proposal will need to be
considerably refined before its implementation.13'
All in all, the proposals for facilitating simultaneous new equity issues
should be supported, and are consistent with the arguments advanced earlier
in this article regarding both foreign issuers in U.S. markets and U.S. issuers
abroad. However, their development is perhaps less urgent than reform of
the integrated disclosure requirements for foreign issuers, given that issuer
32
demand for simultaneous offerings is likely to be moderate.
VI
CONCLUSION

All other things being equal, securities business will gravitate towards the
largest, deepest markets. If it is true, however, that issuers and investors are
significantly deterred by the disclosure requirements of U.S. securities laws,
then all other things are not equal, and we can expect a tilting of the center of
gravity away from U.S. markets. That process will be accelerated by the
increasing willingness of issuers and investors to look beyond national
127. Most countries of the British Commonwealth model their statutory liability provisions on the
British Companies Act, 1948, § 43. See L. GOWER, THE PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 384ff

(4th ed. 1979).
128. See Release No. 6,568, supra note 4, at 87,322.
129. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a(l1) (1982).
130. For a similar safe harbor proposal, see Cooper, surpa note 114. See also Larose, Extraterntorial
Application of Securities Regulation and Internationalizationof Securities Markets: The United States Approach, 4
COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 80, 90 (1986).
131. Security Act Rule 175, 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1987) (projections), and Regulation D, 17
C.F.R. §§ 230.501-506 (1987) (limited offer and sale of securities) suggest that a rule could be
devised.
132. See Exchange Act Rule 12g3-2(d)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(d)(3) (1987). See also Release
No. 4,708, supra note 93.
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frontiers, and by the deregulatory and technological changes which have

facilitated international communications linkages and the growth of
multinational securities firms. It seems timely, in the interests of U.S. markets
and U.S. investors, for the SEC now to review its treatment of foreign issuers
in U.S. markets and of U.S. issuers overseas, as well as to facilitate
simultaneous equity offerings.

